What does it mean to be a kin majority? Analyzing Romanian identity in Moldova and Russian identity in Crimea from below by Knott, Eleanor
  
Eleanor Knott 
What does it mean to be a kin majority? 
Analyzing Romanian identity in Moldova 
and Russian identity in Crimea from below 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Knott, Eleanor (2015) What does it mean to be a kin majority? Analyzing Romanian identity in 
Moldova and Russian identity in Crimea from below. Social Science Quarterly, 96 (3). pp. 830-
859. ISSN 0038-4941  
 
DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12193 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2015 John Wiley and Sons 
CC BY 4.0 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63888/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: Online: November 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL 
(http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
 
 
What Does it Mean to Be a Kin Majority?
Analyzing Romanian Identity in Moldova
and Russian Identity in Crimea from Below∗
Eleanor Knott, London School of Economics and Political Science
Objective. This article investigates what kin identification means from a bottom-up perspective
in two kin majority cases: Moldova and Crimea. Methods. The article is based on 50 fieldwork
interviews conducted in bothMoldova andCrimeawith everyday social actors (2012–2013).Results.
Ethnic homogeneity for kin majorities is more fractured that previously considered. Respondents
identified more in terms of assemblages of ethnic, cultural, political, linguistic, and territorial
identities than in mutually exclusive census categories.Conclusions.To understand fully the relations
between kin majorities, their kin-state and home-state and the impact of growing kin engagement
policies, like dual citizenship, it is necessary to analyze the complexities of the lived experience of
kin identification for members of kin majorities and how this relates to kin-state identification and
affiliation. Understanding these complexities helps to have a more nuanced understanding of the
role of ethnicity in post-Communist societies, in terms of kin-state and intrastate relations.
Introducing the Kin Majority Problem
In post-Communist states there has been an emergence of new and renewed cross-border
ties where kin-states reach out to those they claim as co-ethnic (kin communities). In the
1990s, kin-state relations were considered as increasing the likelihood of conflict, yet kin-
states’ territorial claims failed to materialize. Instead kin-states moved toward institutional
engagement with external kin communities by facilitating their acquisition of citizenship
and quasi-citizenship. Despite the proliferation of these policies, little research engages with
the kin community by exploring how they identify and the lived experience of kin-state
policies. Similarly, there has been a focus only on kin minorities and little consideration
of the phenomenon of kin majorities, defined in this article as a community claimed as
co-ethnic by a kin-state, which form a majority in the state or substate unit in which they
reside.
This article examines and compares two post-Communist/Soviet examples of
kin majorities in Moldova and Crimea. This phenomenon of kin-states and kin
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communities/majorities policies is not unique to post-Communist identity politics since
there are many examples beyond post-Communist space (e.g., South Korea, India). How-
ever, the concentration of these policies in post-Communist Europe and Eurasia, in a zone
of intense state-building and nation-building, and across spaces of free (E.U./Schengen
zone) and restricted movement (To´th, 2006; Zaiotti, 2007), makes these comparisons of
kin-states and co-ethnic majorities a relevant and important endeavor from a conceptual,
empirical, and policy perspective.
Empirically, this is important because existing kin relations research on the cases of
Crimea and Moldova is sparse and based on top-down assumptions. For example, Eyal
and Smith (1996:223) state that there “can be no doubt” that Moldovans “can only be
considered Romanians.” Similarly in Crimea, few studies have researched everyday identity
politics in the region in its own right, treating Crimea as an ethnic outlier within Ukraine
(Fournier, 2002; Wilson, 2002).
Using “everyday nationalism” and political ethnographic approaches, this article explores
the meaning of kin identification in these two kin majority cases, Moldova and Crimea,
by exploring from a bottom-up perspective how individuals identify themselves relative
to their home-state and kin-state.1 The article therefore provides a crucial insight that
questions these top-down assumptions at a time preceding the heightened geopoliticized
nature of post-Soviet space, since Crimea’s annexation by Russia and the ensuing separatist
conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk. The article finds that there are many different ways
of identifying with the kin-state that blur mutually exclusive census categories, such as
Romanian/Moldovan and Russian/Ukrainian boundaries. This article demonstrates that
kin majorities are an important phenomenon to research because when viewed from below,
they appear far more fractured than their majority status would indicate.
From Kin Minorities from Above to Kin Majorities from Below
External states, such as kin states, have an important role in affecting domestic outcomes
such as “group cohesion and political mobilization” because external states can provide
key “material, political and moral support” tipping the balance of domestic politics (Gurr,
1993:128). External states are therefore key actors both in civil wars (Gurr, 1993), and
in the creation of de facto states, when a “patron” state offers external support in the
absence of external legitimacy (Kolstø, 2006:723). What makes kin-state research specific
are the bonds of co-ethnicity that kin-states use to claim as basis of their right to engage
with kin communities,2 that is, kin-states toward kin communities irrespective of how kin
community actors identify (e.g., Bulgaria towardMacedonia or Romania towardMoldova).
These claims have obscured understanding of kin community identification from an actor-
centered perspective, leading to homogenized understandings of the kin community as if
it uniformly identifies co-ethnically and with kin-state, and have ignored the phenomenon
of kin majorities. This article argues that it is necessary to combine approaches to kin-state
relations that argue that nationalism is a relational and interactive politics between different
actors (Brubaker, 1996) with bottom-up everyday approaches to identification that shift
1Fieldwork was conducted in 2012 and 2013 in Crimea and therefore this is predominantly a study of
Crimea before Yanukovich left office and pro-Russian groups in Crimea seized power.
2This article also makes a conceptual distinction between kin-states that make claims toward kin commu-
nities arising from border shift (e.g., Romania toward Moldova, Russia toward Crimea) and the larger field
of diaspora states, which make and try to retain claims with co-ethnic communities residing outside of the
kin-state following emigration (e.g., Jewish, Chinese, and Indian diasporas).
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TABLE 1
Previous Approaches to Kin-State Relations
Perspective Critique
Antagonistic: Originally
Brubaker (1996) and
developed by Fearon and
Laitin (2003), van Houten
(1998), Smith (2002), also
Caspersen (2008)
Triadic nexus → antagonism
between states potential
source of conflict
Absence of conflict
Does not account for kin-state
introduction of policies
Top-down institutional approach
Kin minority focus
Fuzzy: Fowler (2004), Batt
(2002)
Kin-state policies cause fuzzy
relations between states in
the nexus
Not conflictual because
states willing to share
sovereignty over shared
citizenry
Assumes kin-state policies
unproblematic
Top-down institutional approach
Kin minority focus
understandings of relational kin-state politics away from top-down state-level analysis to
unpack the agency, and forms of identification, of the kin community, in particular for the
phenomenon of kin majorities.
To conceptualize these relational dynamics of nationalism, Brubaker developed a theory
of a “triadic configuration” of a kin minority, an “external national homeland” state (kin-
state), and a “nationalizing” home-state where the kin minority reside (1996:55). The
kin-state, as the “external homeland” of the kin minority, claims an “obligation” to “protect
the interests of’their’’ ethno-national kin” residing in other states (Brubaker, 1996:5),
while the nationalizing home-state of “newly independent (or newly configured) states”
advanced claims and policies “in the name of a ‘core nation’” as the “legitimate ‘owner’
of the state” (Brubaker, 1996:4–5). While recognizing Brubaker’s conceptual contribution
for understanding the ebbs and flow of nationalist politics as arising from such relations,
rather than seeing nationalism as a given area of contention within politics (Smith and
Wilson, 1997), this article makes several critiques of Brubaker’s approach and those who
have developed his approach, categorized as antagonistic and fuzzy (Table 1).
Following Brubaker (1996:111) and his emphasis on the competing and opposing
nationalistic claims of “ownership” by the kin-state and home-state over the same set of
people, the antagonistic approach argues that competing claims between the home-state and
kin-state toward the kin community could be a potential cause of conflict (Laitin, 1998,
2001; Fearon, 1998; Saideman and Ayres, 2008; van Houten, 1998; Smith, 2002). The
former Soviet Union, in particular, was a key location where these theories were tested with
this space imagined as a “cauldron of ethnic conflict” (Figueiredo andWeingast, 1999:262)
because it was the site of the “potentially most dangerous” of modern kin-state claims,
given Russia’s large diaspora spread across former Soviet territory (Brubaker, 1996:108).
While Fearon (1998:124) framed Russia as having a pathological potential to be the
“most likely danger” in the region, he identified that Russia suffered a “commitment
problem” that inhibited Russia from actually engaging in conflict to protect its diaspora.
Fearon (1998:124) explained that, even in the presence of antagonism, kin-states could
be “self-limiting,” constraining the spread of conflict that might otherwise be conceived as
able to spread like “wildlife.” Hence van Houten (1998) argued that kin-states were key
in tipping the balance from antagonistic claims to conflict-inducing intervention, leaving
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conflicts in some triadic relations (e.g., Croatia and Serbia, following Serbian intervention)
but not in others (e.g., Estonia and Crimea vis-a`-vis Russia).
However, not only has kin-state conflict been rare (Laitin, 2001), but the antagonistic
approach reduced kin-state relations to considering only ethnic conflict and irredentism
as the goal of kin-state politics (King and Melvin, 2000), rather than the potentially
more banal kin-state policies (citizenship, quasi-citizenship) that replaced these irredentist
politics of the early post-Soviet/Communist period (until Crimea’s annexation in 2014).
The second approach focused on these kin-state policies, arguing that the growth of these
policies was evidence of a “fuzzy” type of politics (Batt, 2002; Fowler, 2004). According
to this fuzzy argument, these overlapping citizenries and shared loyalties across borders are
reflected by a general move toward cosmopolitan norms, and of the postnationalization
of the nation-state. In this setting, the multiplicity of citizenships and sovereignties is
deproblematized and citizenship is no longer delineated legally, ethnically, or politically by
the borders of the nation-state.
Both approaches focus on top-down state-level actors and institutions, obscuring the
agency of these kin community members who, for example, are the people eligible and
applying for dual citizenship from their kin-state. Moreover, if kin-state policies are pre-
sumed to be part of a “soft power” approach of co-optation of “people and societies, rather
than governments and elites” then it is appropriate to study these people (Tsygankov,
2006:1081) to learn more about the effectiveness of kin-states to “bind” kin communities
to kin-states, and away from their home-state, as Roslycky (2011:304) argues Russia did
in Crimea.
Second, these antagonistic and fuzzy approaches have treated kin minorities as analogous
to kin majority cases, rather than considering them as separate phenomena. This is not a
criticism only of Brubaker but of all those who also did not distinguish between kin mi-
norities and kin majorities (Waterbury, 2011; Laitin, 1998, 2001; Fearon, 1998; Saideman
and Ayres, 2008; Smith, 2002), treating kin majorities as if they are kin minorities, which
is an unreasonable assumption because of the differential demographic and power status
of minorities and majorities in their home-state. For example, it would not be appropriate
to consider kin majorities’ home-states to also be their “host-state,” as in the case of ethnic
Russians in Estonia (Pogonyi, Kova´cs, and Ko¨rtve´lyesi, 2010:1) and Germans/Koreans in
Kazakhstan (Diener, 2006). Kin majorities therefore need to be studied in their own right.
As the top-down antagonistic and fuzzy approaches do not disaggregate the category
of kin majority, this article uses a bottom-up perspective to analyze the meaning of kin
identification for members of kin majorities. Caspersen (2008) highlights the importance
of exploring the role of kin community elites in mediating conflict and analyzing the rela-
tionship between bottom-up conflict and the kin-state. However, she does not consider the
fractures that run within kin communities, in particular kin majorities. Everyday nation-
alism is therefore a useful approach because it allows disaggregation of the kin community
from the bottom by engaging with the meanings and experiences of identification.
This article moves now to discuss literature of ethnicity in political science, to show
the usefulness of everyday nationalism approaches both to kin-state research and ethnic
politics research more generally. Following Chandra (2009), ethnicity in political science
is considered as an independent variable, that is, an explanatory tool and a dependent
variable, something to be explained; however, these approaches take an overly deductive
approach that fails to understand, inductively, the meanings and experiences of ethnicity
from agency-centered perspectives (as everyday nationalism and interpretive approaches
do). As an independent variable, ethnicity and in particular ethnic diversity, for example,
via ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices (ELF), is considered to be a potential cause of
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conflict between different groups (Roeder, 2011; Alesina et al., 2003; Posner, 2004; Fearon
and Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2003), the onset of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004), a tool to be instrumentalized by elites to engage, or not engage, in conflict
(Kaufman, 2001;Wilkinson, 2006), in inhibiting democratization and democratic stability
(Pop-Eleches, 2007; Wilkinson, 2006; Przeworski, 2000) and inclusion (Horowitz, 1993).
While, on a theoretical level, these studies appreciate ethnicity to be a constructed identity,
by using census data, they retain measures of ethnicity with an “essentialistic premise”
(Laitin and Posner, 2001:17) by assuming that these “given categories” and mutually
exclusive categories reflect on-the-ground realities and experiences (Wedeen, 2002:724;
Chandra andWilkinson, 2008:518). As the breadth of census critiques show (Arel, 2002b;
see alsoUehling, 2004;Dave, 2004; Kertzer and Arel, 2002; Arel, 2002a), censuses are often
more illuminating about a state project’s ethnic identification than about how individuals
identify (Brubaker, 2011; Goldscheider, 2002). Second, at least in terms of ethnic conflict
and ELF indices, they are still unable to provide convincing evidence of the effect of
ethnicity as an independent variable of conflict (Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008).
Instead, as Chandra (2009) argues, more research needs to consider how ethnicity is
constructed, that is, as something to be explained (dependent variable). However, this
has still maintained a deductive approach, leading to functional explanations of ethnicity
on the one hand, as providing “uncertainty reduction” (Hale, 2008:9), or as a strategic
choice (Laitin, 1998), in line with the dominance of rational choice approaches, or, on
the other hand, as a descent-based concept constructed through “myths of common ances-
try” (Chandra, 2001, 2006:397; Chandra and Wilkinson, 2008; Weber, 1978; Horowitz,
1985; Smith, 2003), where ethnicity is imagined as a “sticky” identity (i.e., unchangeable)
(Chandra 2006). These perspectives fail to unpack, inductively, what ethnicity means from
an agency perspective or to analyze ethnicity from the perspective that there might be
thicker explanations (Wedeen, 2002), beyond seeing ethnicity as something to be chosen
as part of an assimilation strategy (Laitin, 1998). Second, they are concerned largely with
relations between ethnic minorities and majorities, such as Chandra (2006) who argues
that boundaries between groups are “visible” (i.e., identifiable), when these boundaries be-
tween groups can often be blurred and indistinguishable (Kachuyevski and Olesker, 2014).
As this article will show, this obscures, too, within-group dynamics that show the con-
testations existing within majorities over the “content” of these groups and the meanings
attached (Abdelal et al., 2006). Political research therefore needs to do more to understand
what ethnicity means and “how it [ethnicity] will manifest itself in politics” (Beissinger,
2008:88).
This article argues that the everyday nationalism approach fits well with the need for a
more inductive analysis of ethnicity, for both kin-state research and ethnic politics more
generally, by refocusing attention on exploring the “lay” categories of “everyday social
experience” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000:4). In turn, this allows researchers to engage
with how people “enact (and ignore and deflect) nationhood and nationalism in the varied
contexts of their everyday lives” (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008:537; see also Brubaker et al.,
2011; Dawson, 2012; Gagnon, 2006; Day and Thompson, 2004; de Cillia, Reisigl, and
Wodak, 1999; Miller-Idriss, 2009). Moreover, it engages with the complexities of lived
experiences of ethnic identification where a fundamental part of Soviet and post-Soviet
experience has been of living in ethnically and linguistically diverse families (Pirie, 1996;
Gorenburg, 2006).3 This everyday and people-centered approach therefore has a great
3Indeed, Gorenburg (2006) notes that the phenomenon and impact of ethnically mixed families was highly
researched in the Soviet Union.
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TABLE 2
The Kin Majority Typology
Proportion of
Ethnic Ethnic Kin Majority
Majority Kin in Polity Kin- Kin-State
Polity Majority (Percent) State Policies
Autonomous and
sovereign state
Moldova Romanian 77 Romania Citizenship
Macedonia Macedonian/
Bulgarian
65 Bulgaria Citizenship
Kosovoa Kosovar/
Albanian
92 Albania Citizenship
Autonomous
substate but
not sovereign
state
Crimeab Russian 59–77 Russia Quasi-citizenship
Republika
Srpska
Serbia 96 Serbia Citizenship
De facto
independent,
but not de jure
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Armenian 95 Armenia Quasi-citizenship
(but citizenship
for refugees)
aKosovo functions as a largely autonomous and sovereign state recognized by 103/193 (53 percent) of
U.N. member states, including 23/28 (82 percent) E.U. member states.
bCrimea is considered in its pre-2014 configuration, that is, as an autonomous republic of Ukraine.
potential for deepening the understanding of kin-state relations by exploring what kin
identification means and how it is constructed by actors. So far, these everyday nationalism
perspectives have concerned predominantly domestic ethnic politics, that is, within local
settings; this article argues that these everyday perspectives provide useful avenues for
kin-state research also, by allowing for more engagement with kin community actors and,
for this article, kin majority actors who have been overlooked by kin-state research.
Research Methodology
This article analyzes two kin majority cases: Moldova and Crimea, which are similar in
terms of their demographic, historical, and political context and differ in the nature of
kin-state policies available.4 These cases were selected from a wider kin majority typology
(Table 2), which primarily focuses on post-Communist and post-Soviet cases as a region
of higher border flux (Brubaker and Kim, 2006).5 From this typology, the cases of Crimea
and Moldova were selected as both are domestically complex and potentially unstable
(Ciscel, 2010), situated in the internationally “strategically important,” and increasingly
competitive, space between the European Union and Russia (Sasse, 2007:1; Korosteleva,
2010), and performing as “objects of keen geopolitical competition” between the E.U.
4It should be noted that this is not a perfect “Mill’s method” comparison based on a single difference (see
King et al., 1994; George and Bennett, 2005) because the cases also differ in terms of their sovereignty status.
However, the level of autonomy is not considered of great importance for this research because of its focus on
people rather than state systems.
5This is not to suggest that the conclusions from the article do not have significance beyond these cases and
the region, as discussed below.
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neighborhood6 and Russian near abroad heightened by events in Ukraine since 2014
(Lukyanov, 2009:57; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2012; Bordachev et al., 2014). In terms of
comparability, these cases experienced similar territorial flux, having been part of their
respective kin-states during the 20th century; until 1991 they were part of the Soviet
Union, in the post-Soviet context they were subject to territorial claims that had largely
subsided (until Crimea’s de facto annexation in March 2014).
To operationalize the everyday nationalism approach, I conducted50 semi-structured
interviews in both cases with everyday actors (2012–2013). Using a conversational style,
I guided respondents to discuss their general opinions on local culture and politics before
asking themmore specifically about how they conceived of, and constructed, their identity.7
While the article focuses on these interviews, I also conducted participant observation of
everyday activities, such as local protests and festivals, and everyday life by living with local
people, recorded in daily fieldwork notes, which acted as an informing mechanism for
observing the issues I was interested in discussing in interviews.
While everyday nationalism is usually conducted from a purely ethnographic approach
of observing ethnicity in situ, this research instead engaged with respondents via semi-
structured interviews using a conversational style and an interview guide (Appendix),
which acted as a thematic guiding tool without explicit reference to the interview guide
during the interview.8 This everyday nationalism approach was combined with an inter-
pretive ontology, which seeks to gain “experience-near”/emic understandings of identities,
institutions, and concepts (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow,
2012; Geertz, 1975:29), as opposed to deductive, top-down, or experience-far concepts.
Hence the interviews sought to engage with respondents’ experiences of ethnicity, along-
side other forms of identification, how they gave ethnicity meaning and explained their
identification (e.g., by discussing everyday customs/traditions, food practices, language
rights), how they positioned themselves vis-a`-vis others and framed others, signifying the
boundaries they experienced, and hence how they experienced, negotiated, and subverted
top-down categories of identification. To this end, respondents were asked both more di-
rect questions about ethnicity than might be usual for an ethnographic everyday approach
to nationalism, alongside questions that asked them to situate themselves vis-a`-vis their
home-state and kin-state, as well as follow-up questions, beyond the interview guide, which
tried to undercover their explanations of how and why they described themselves in certain
ways. The interviews tried to combine a consistent approach, across respondents and cases,
with a richness of explanation, across respondents’ diverse experiences, to provide insights
into the “signification” and “meaning-making” content of ethnic identification (Wedeen,
2009:80).
When selecting respondents (Table 3), I aimed not for representativeness, as this is not
a valid measurement for the rigor of small-n research (Small, 2009). Rather, I wanted
to engage with a breadth of “multiple perspectives” and “contradictory narratives” by in-
terviewing across the political spectrum (e.g., across the youth wings of political parties)
6The states of both the E.U. neighborhood and Russian near abroad: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan.
7Interviews were conducted in the preferred language of the respondent: in Crimea the majority were
conducted in Russia; inMoldova the majority were conducted in Romanian and English, with a few conducted
wholly or partially in Russian.
8This approach differs also from usual everyday nationalism approaches (which focus on meanings and
practices) by focusing on the lived experience of kin identification as primarily here kin-state and home-state
meanings, whereas kin-state practices are associated with engagement with kin-state policies (citizenship and
quasi-citizenship), which form a part of the research not considered in this article.
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TABLE 3
Types of Respondents
Moldova Crimea
Young people Youth wings of main political parties Youth wings of main political parties
(18–35 years) Student and youth organizations Student and youth organizations
Ordinary students and young people Ordinary students and young people
>35 years Members of other organizations Members of other organizations
Other ordinary citizens Other ordinary citizens
as well as with organizations and individually that were not directly politically active
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012:51). A large number of potential respondents were
contacted either by phone or e-mail, either by cold calling (i.e., contacting without rec-
ommendations based on Internet sources of organizations) or snowballing (using previous
respondents’ recommendations), with these potential respondents becoming actual respon-
dents when they responded and interviews were arranged. The research did not begin as
a deliberate study of the post-Soviet generation, but in the field these individuals were
more accessible (via the Internet) and more approachable from an outsider perspective,
and it was easier to build a trustful rapport with my peers (in terms of age), and to main-
tain contact within and beyond the field (e.g., via e-mail and social media) who were
from the younger post-Soviet generation. In terms of identity characteristics, respondents
were not chosen based on their ethnicity or citizenship status as this was unknown until
I asked them during the interview. Interviews were primarily conducted in the capitals
of each case (Chis¸ina˘u, Simferopol) with control interviews conducted in second cities
(Ba˘lt¸i, Yalta).9
The rest of this article analyzes the collected data by engaging with what kin identifica-
tion means in these cases. To do this, how respondents are identified and their rationale is
conceptualized through inductively derived identification categories as a tool for explaining
and analyzing these rich context-specific data by codifying respondents’ “emic” descrip-
tions. These categories were derived via a “grounded theory” approach that used open
inductive coding to analyze how similarities and differences emerged from data (Corbin
and Strauss, 1990), by looking for trends in how respondents identified themselves, situated
themselves within the home-state and kin-state, and, most importantly, their rationale for
this identification and situation, and grouping respondents according to these trends by
devising these “theoretical” inductive categories (Charmaz, 2010:156). These categories did
not remain fixed throughout the analysis period, but rather, shifted in an iterative process
as data were analyzed for categorization that explained, and maintained, the nuances of the
data. Neither did these inductive categories seek to evoke the kind of groupist problems that
Brubaker (2004) argues explanations of ethnicity should avoid. Rather, these categories are
a tool to conceptualize the complexity and contestations of co-ethnic identification, where
mutually exclusive census categories appear blurred and the relationship with the kin-
state seems more contingent, demonstrating that it was only a minority of respondents
whose co-ethnic identification corresponded to identifying with the kin-state.
9By control interview, I mean interviews that were conducted in a second site within the same case to test
if there were significant differences between the respondents in the main site where interviews were being
conducted (Chis¸ina˘u, Simferopol).
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TABLE 4
Explanation of Identification Categories for Crimean Case
Language
Place of Birth Russian Ukrainian Russia Ukraine Crimea
Discriminated Crimea or Native and Lack desire Spiritual Anti- Russian
Russians Russia everyday and motherland Ukraine motherland
proficiency
Ethnic Russians Crimea or Native and Lack Cultural Neutral Russian
Russia everyday proficiency motherland motherland
Crimean Crimea Native and Relatively Worse than Immature Only
everyday proficient Ukraine state motherland
Political Crimea Native and Relatively Anti- Pro- Integral part
Ukrainians everyday proficient Russia Ukraine of Ukraine
Ethnic Other Everyday Native Viewed as Cultural Integral
Ukrainians Ukrainian Other and motherland part of
regions malign Ukraine
Crimea: The Meaning of Kin Identification
Within Ukraine, Crimea is an ethnic outlier as the only region where a majority
(58 percent) is identified as ethnically Russian (2001 Ukrainian census).10 Due to its
demography and the threat of separatism in the 1990s, Crimea has been unable to shake
off the image of being a hotbed of Russian nationalism and the idea that it could be
the “next South Ossetia” (Krushelnycky, 2008; Maigre, 2008; Kuzio, 2014).11 However,
Russian movements failed to gain much ground after 1994 when they were unable to con-
vince more than a small minority to support secession or Russian irredentism (Sasse, 2007).
Crimea’s referendum in 2014 in support of unification with Russia might indicate that
pro-Russian separatist sentiment remained. However, the findings of this section suggest
that strong identification with Russia was a minority sentiment.12
To conceptualize the ways that respondents identified as Russian and/or Ukrainian, the
respondents are grouped in five inductively derived identification categories (Table 4):
1. Discriminated Russians emphasized a strong Russian identification and felt threatened
by the Ukrainian state.
2. Ethnic Russians also identified primarily as Russian but without feeling discriminated.
3. Political Ukrainians identified primarily as citizens of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic
identification.
4. Crimeans identified primarily regionally and interethnically, identifying as between
Ukrainian and Russian.
5. Ethnic Ukrainians identified ethnically and linguistically as Ukrainian.
As described above in the section on research methodology, these categories were derived
via a “grounded theory” approach, via open coding, to conceptualize the areas of agreement
10Other regions have a majority of Russian speakers (Donetsk, Luhansk), like Crimea (77 percent), but
Crimea is still the only region where a majority ethnically identify as Russian (according to the 2001 census).
11This refers to the idea that Crimea is similar to South Ossetia where there was a war between Russia and
Georgia over the territory in 2008.
12Official results for the March 16, 2014 referendum report that there was 97 percent turnout, of which
83 percent supported joining Russia (see State Council of the Republic of Crimea, 2014); however, the results
are refuted and the referendum seen as illegal by the OSCE, European Union, and the United States.
What Does it Mean to Be a Kin Majority? 839
(e.g., Russian identification) and disagreement (discrimination), where disagreements could
be conceptualized via different inductive categories along cultural and political dimensions
(Table 5).
Discriminated Russians—“Here it is Impossible to Be Anything Short of Russian”
C-19a, C-19b, C-20, C-24, C-25, C-48a, C-48b, C-55. Discriminated Russians iden-
tified strongly as ethnically Russian and anti-Ukrainian because they felt discriminated
by post-Soviet Ukraine. Many of these respondents were affiliated with local Russian and
compatriot organizations based in Simferopol, such as Russkaia Obschina Kryma (Russian
Community of Crimea, hereafter ROC).
They framed Crimea as a native and historic “Russian cultural enclave” [C-19a,
C-48a, C-48b], which was “better” for Russians than elsewhere in Ukraine because outside
Crimea, everything “is in Ukrainian language all the time” and there were “no products
for the Russian-speaking population” [C-25]. Russia was their homeland from where they
had been politically separated and they retained a sense of fraternity with Russians in
Russia, and beyond, as Russia was “more than the Russian Federation” because it “exists in
the brotherhood” [C-24]. Hence they had a strong Russian ethnic identification that was
rooted in their sense of belonging to Crimea and to a transnational Russian fraternity.
Discriminated Russians expressed antipathy toward Ukraine’s “forced” policy of
Ukrainization (Ukrainizatsia) because it aimed to “assimilate Russians” [C-25, C-24].
This created an “infringement of the rights of Russians,” where “priority” was given to
Ukrainian language and education [C-24, C-55]. Even Russian-language education was
criticized for being “completely Ukrainian” because it is required to teach the “history
of collaborators during World War II [ . . . ] Bandera, Shukhevych” and in kindergarten
to teach Ukrainian songs and poems.13 Katchanovski saw this privileging of Ukrainian
in everyday life as particularly unfair and even dangerous for the elderly. For example,
prescription instructions were now in Ukrainian and not Russian and this was dangerous
because the elderly “cannot understand the technical terms in the Ukrainian language”
[C-19a, C-25, C-55].
Though Discriminated Russians were not defined by age, they emphasized a critical
generational divide in Crimea where the “young generation, almost quite often understand”
Ukrainian because of post-Soviet education policies, while for “older people it causes a
problem” [C-55]. Ultimately, these respondents resented the newly privileged status of
Ukrainian language and culture within state and society, and thereby resisted being within
the Ukrainian frame of governance.
They argued that the group threatened byUkrainization in Crimea was wider than ethnic
Russians and wanting, at least superficially, to protect the rights of “Russian speakers” as
much as ethnic Russians [C-19a].14 C-24 saw it as “doubly wrong” that Ukrainian language
and culture had a privileged status in Crimea because Crimea was a “multinational” region
and so the “vast majority” of other ethnic groups are Russian speakers. However, this
concern for other groups was paradoxical given their deep antipathy toward other groups
13Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych are extremely controversial figures in independent Ukraine. They
are seen as heroes by ardent Ukrainian nationalists, in particular in western Ukraine, and Nazi collaborators
by ardent Russian nationalists (see Marples, 2006; Katchanovski, 2014).
14This discourse is promoted by the Russian state, which seeks to promote the rights of Russians abroad
as part of the compatriot policy, and is found more generally by Fournier (2002) among Russian groups in
Ukraine.
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in Crimea and especially Crimean Tatars.15 C-24 believed that Crimean Tatar nationalism
“leaves no room for Russians in Crimea” by framing Crimea as “only the birthplace of
Crimean Tatars” and no other group. This was framed not just in symbolic but also material
terms, because they felt discriminated in how land was distributed more favorably to Tatars
in Crimea than to themselves [C-20].
These respondents disliked Ukraine’s efforts to consolidate the nation-state and con-
sequently they had no sense of political attachment to or identification as a “patriot” of
Ukraine [C-48a, C-48b]. C-24 expressed that she did not vote in elections “because they
are all against me as a citizen” as “almost all the parties in Ukraine are anti-Russian,” so
that they felt as an unwanted “stepchild” within Ukraine. This group therefore demon-
strated the strongest identification as Russian and the weakest identification as Ukrainian.
They resented Ukraine’s state-building and nation-building efforts, which infringed on
their rights to speak and be Russian, and did not respect their rights as the historic and
demographically dominant inhabitants of Crimea.
Ethnic Russians—“For Me Russian Culture is Everything, Pushkin is Our Everything”
C-1, C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11c, C-14a, C-14b, C-15, C-16, C-21, C-22, 33, C-24,
C-46, C-51, C-53, C-57b. Ethnic Russians, identifying primarily as ethnically Russian,
saw Russia as their cultural homeland. However, they felt less culturally threatened by the
Ukrainian state than Discriminated Russians and were more easily able to reconcile being
ethnically Russian with residing in Ukraine.
Respondents saw being Russian and Russian culture as “native” [C-14b, C-15, C-34].
They saw Russian identity as inherited from parents where narod (people, nation) was “like
a family” and even though relatives come from different places, they are “greater Russians”
and “pro-Slavic” [C-9, C-52]. Hence there was an organic association with being Russian
because, as C-21 explained, “every culture is transmitted through blood and mother’s
milk,” where being ethnically Russian was not a choice because “I think in Russian so I am
Russian” [C-3, C-22]. Like Discriminated Russians, this group saw Crimea as historically
“Russian land” and a “Russian enclave” because of the importance of Crimea to Russian
writers and to the Russian empire [C-8, C-9, C-14b, C-53].
Ethnic Russians had a strong attachment to Crimea, seeing Crimea as a place of Russians
who shared both Crimea and Russia as their homeland. They felt an ongoing emotional at-
tachment to Russia because Russia was their “big motherland” and “historical motherland”
while Crimea was their “small motherland” [C-3, C-15, C-34, C-53]. However, this was
mitigated by less favorable attitudes to Russia as a political entity because Russia did not
“understand” Crimea: Putin merely wanted to undermine and disrespect Ukrainian politi-
cians [C-22]. Equally, C-22 explained that Ukraine did not understand that identifying as
Russian and speaking Russian was not analogous to being a “patriot of Putin” [C-22].
Instead, several members of this group expressed a sense of patriotism toward Ukraine
[C-8, C-22, C-46]. There was a complicated sense of what Russia meant to this group, as
somewhere that evoked a cultural but not political attachment because they felt content
to remain part of Ukraine, where being Russian did not exclude them from being part of
Ukraine. Though C-21 professed a natural sense of Russian identity, he also described how
15Crimean Tatars are a Muslim minority group who were deported from Crimea in 1944 by order of Stalin.
Many Tatars have returned to Crimea since the end of the Soviet Union, with the proportion growing from
1.9 percent in 1989 to 12.1 in 2001, with 243,400 residing in Crimea by 2001 and the number continuing
to grow since (Ukrainian Census 2001).
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he had “nothing against Ukraine as a state” because “this is my state.” This group was also
more willing to speak Ukrainian than Discriminated Russians. Even though they were still
native Russian speakers, they did not see language as such an “acute issue” and did not
observe a “strangulation of Russian culture” [C-21, C-22]. Instead, disputes over language
were “at the political level, the establishment level” because at the “everyday level, there are
no differences” as people can speak the language they wish [C-22, C-53].
Though Ethnic Russians did not reject being part of Ukraine, they did express some
confusion about what it meant to reside in, and be a citizen of, Ukraine. Crimea was seen
as an “integral part of Ukraine” [C-51], but this was combined with the idea that Ukraine
was a new state that had been created more out of the dissolution of the Soviet Union
than by an active process [C-22, C-34]. A young respondent explained that she did not
feel Ukrainian or “patriotic” about Ukraine because she did not know about Ukrainian
traditions and culture “like they do in west Ukraine” [C-33]. She wanted to be “more
patriotic toward Ukraine” and to “know more” about Ukrainian culture and ethnicity
because she felt she should as it “will be right . . . we are a country” [C-33].
Ethnic Russians, therefore, wanted to fit more into Ukraine, at least politically, not as a
“strategic” choice to assimilate (Laitin, 1998), but because of the normative sense that it was
appropriate to want to belong to the state in which you reside. Overall, this group indicated
a greater acceptance of being governed by Ukraine, even if there was a sense of confusion
and uncertainty about fitting the necessary criteria to be considered fully Ukrainian, and a
sense that they should feel Ukrainian, as this was now where they resided.
Political Ukrainians—“I Feel More Like a Ukrainian Citizen”
C-2b, C-11a, C-11b, C-12, C-16, C-18, C-23, C-28, C-29, C-30, C-31, C-32,
C-37, C-40, C-47, C-59. Political Ukrainians identified primarily with Ukraine polit-
ically, above identifying as ethnically Russian or Ukrainian. The group was predominantly
comprised by young people. This group is the most interesting for Crimea because it
contradicts the dominant understanding of Crimea, with many respondents emphasizing
their identification as Ukrainian citizens first, questioning descent-based understandings
of ethnic identification.
Respondents did not believe that ethnicity or language were important issues in Crimea,
or related to quality of life, because in Crimea “citizens live badly, it is independent from
ethnicity” [C-23]. There was a strong desire among some of this group not to talk about
ethnicity because talking about ethnicity means “we are on a very low level” and “have
nothing more to say, unfortunately” [C-23]. As such, they nullified the importance of
ethnicity, saying that they want to “feel myself as a citizen, regardless of ethnicity” [C-23,
C-47].
This group was not necessarily fluent in Ukrainian, expressing difficulties in the “mixed
education” system and switching between Russian to Ukrainian language in education
[C-47, C-32, C-2b]. However, they had a greater willingness and expertise in speaking
Ukrainian thanDiscriminated and Ethnic Russian respondents. Crucially, they thought that
in Ukraine the political elite [C-2b] and populace should be able to speak Ukrainian as the
state language and should know Ukrainian history [C-12, C-59].
They identified with Ukraine because it was “my home” [C-59]. As C-37 explained, “I
am Ukrainian” and “not Russian” because I “was not born in Russia” but in Crimea, which
“is Ukraine.”Many of these respondents had been born whenUkraine was an “independent
state” [C-31] (i.e., after 1991), which was important because they felt that Crimea was
more politically connected to Ukraine than Discriminated and Ethnic Russians. This group
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had little sympathy for ethnic Russians in Crimea who felt discriminated because they did
not see how there was discrimination in schools because there were “enough schools in
Russian language” [C-18].
Respondents described the contrast between themselves and their parents, who they
identified as ethnically Russian [C-11a, C-11b, C-30, C-32]. They explained how they
had “partly Russian blood, partly Ukrainian, but mostly Russian” but felt “more Ukrainian”
because this was where they were born and they were Ukrainian citizens [C-32, C-59].
This caused disputes between themselves and their parents. For example, C-30’s parents
wanted to keep celebrating New Year twice (according to local and Moscow time) while
she wanted to celebrate it just once according to Ukrainian time because she was “from
Ukraine.” Political Ukrainians therefore saw Russia as somewhere foreign and observed how
Russians also identified them as foreign because they were from Ukraine [C-28, C-59].
This highlighted the contingency of ethnic identification where ethnicity was not nec-
essarily seen in terms of common descent, but modified by politically experiences. Thus
being born and educated in post-Soviet Ukraine disrupted their ethnic identification as
Russian. This sense of contingency was heightened by respondents who described how their
mobility, such as being educated outside Crimea, was the point at which they “understood”
that they liked the “Ukrainian national idea” [C-29, C-30, C-59].
The generational divide was important also because they believed that older residents
in Crimea “do not change” [C-37] and are “stuck in the past” [C-59]. Hence this group
believed that older people were more likely to identify as Russian and be sympathetic
toward the Soviet Union because it was difficult for this generation to “adjust to these new
Ukrainian realities, during last 20 years already” [C-18]. In contrast, they believed that, for
young people, it was “easier [to] feel themselves Ukrainians” because the majority of their
experience was in independent Ukraine [C-18].
Overall, Political Ukrainians defended how it wasmost “correct” and necessary to identify
as Ukrainian [C-27], again not as a strategic motivation to assimilate, but because of a
normative compulsion. In fact, they believed that Kyiv “needs to do more” to integrate
Crimea within Ukraine because even though they lived in Crimea “we’re still in Ukraine”
[C-11b, C-23, C-59, C-30].
Crimean—“Well, Crimean, it’s Partly Russian, Ukrainian, Partly”
C-2a, C-4, C-36, C-38, C-57a. Crimeans identified “first” as Crimean because this
was where they lived [C-2a]. This compares to the other groups who identified somewhat,
but not fully, with Crimea. Their identification as Crimean was largely territorial and
interethnic, being between Ukrainian and Russian, blurring top-down mutually exclusive
ethnic categories.
Crimean was an interethnic identification, where respondents identified as being both
ethnically betweenRussian andUkrainian, and geographically betweenUkraine andRussia.
Respondents felt inhibited from identifying as fully Ukrainian or Russian, and felt partially
both because of their equally ethnically mixed parents [C-36]. Identifying as Crimean
allowed them to negotiate this complexity because Crimea itself was “partly Russian,
Ukrainian partly” [C-36, C-38]. Hence the idea was not just that “we are separate” from
Russia and Ukraine because of the geographic and political position of Crimea, but also
because “we began belonging to one country (Russia), then to another country (Ukraine)”
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[C-57a]. This category reconciled their confusion by identifying as “moreCrimean” [C-38],
which allowed them to remain connected to the peninsula and to identify as simultaneously
but not fully Ukrainian and Russian.
While they felt partly Russian, these respondents were unwilling to identify as fully
Russian also because they did not feel close to Russia. Some respondents noted that they
had never been to Russia [C-36]. Even within families, there was a sense of the differences
between those residing in Russia and those in Crimea. C-57a described how his Russian
relatives from “Piter” when they come to Crimea “arrive with such an accent” and are
patronizing, and even angry, about the Russian accent in Crimea, describing them as “oh
southerners, southerners.”16 He noted also how “we even eat differently” based on the
different ways of eating a common food, varenniki.17
This group exhibited little negativity to Ukraine, but were also mediated in their identi-
fication as Ukrainian and their political affiliation with Ukraine. Like Political Ukrainians,
they thought that Ukraine was not able to understand Crimea. As C-4 explained, to the rest
of Ukraine, Crimea is “like a single town” because they do not understand Crimea’s variety
and complexity. Similarly, they felt that Ukraine is more concerned to protect its own
unitary character because it is a “young” state that cannot “afford” two official languages
due to the “fear that Ukraine would collapse” [C-38].
Crimeans showed the greatest sense of belonging to Crimea because of their interethnic
situation. This translated to limited identification with Ukraine and Russia, but a greater
negativity toward Russia and little resistance to Crimea being part of Ukraine.
Ethnic Ukrainians—“By Birth I’m Ukrainian and Ukrainian Speaking”
C-6, C-13, C-26, C-27, C-45, C-49. Ethnic Ukrainians are the contrast group in the
Crimean case, demonstrating an absence of Russian ethnic and cultural identification and
a strong attachment to Ukraine. They identified according to the singular concept that
they were from Ukraine, spoke Ukrainian, and were part of Ukrainian culture.
Ethnic Ukrainians identified themselves as being Ukrainian “by birth,” were born outside
ofCrimea, and expressed “love” forUkraine andUkrainian culture [C-45,C-26]. They used
their “native” Ukrainian language as a marker of being Ukrainian, representing themselves
in stark contrast to the Crimean majority. However, they were willing to adapt to the local
linguistic context because even though “Ukrainian is the state language,” the “dominant”
language of “interethnic communication in Crimea is still Russian” [C-13, C-26, C-45].
Ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, and in particular Russia, were seen as the defining
other. These separate spheres were collapsed so that “speaking Russian” was assumed to
mean “to feel near to Russia” [C-6], in contrast to Ethnic Russians who objected to such
an assumption. Russia was constructed as a malign and inferior other where “Ukraine is
peaceful in comparison to Russia” and in Ukraine “wealth is more evenly distributed”
[C-26].
Ethnic Ukrainians discredited the identity of Russians in Ukraine as a false consciousness.
They described how Soviet policies had “made [everyone] Russian-speaking” and so “many
have become pro-Russian” even though they “they are not identical to the Russians” [C-49].
Russians were seen as ignorant about Russia because “themajority of Crimeans, themajority
of young Crimeans, . . . have never been to Russia” and therefore held misguided beliefs
16Piter is a common diminutive of St. Petersburg.
17The respondent explained how “they take varenniki dip in sour cream and eat ... There is no vodka, sour
cream, it is okay! It is necessary to douse varenniki with sour cream, not dunk!”
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about how Russia was “something ideal, beautiful” [C-27]. He tried also to delegitimize
Russian movements by explaining how their leaders were not really ethnically Russian
[C-27].18 Russian movements in Crimea were seen as illegitimate and, contrasting with
Discriminated Russians, suggested that these movements created problems that did not
really exist. As C-26 explained, who “would infringe the Russian language and culture
in Crimea” because, based on his experience, he had never encountered any anti-Russian
“prejudice” [C-26]. Overall, this category was the most negative about Russia, feeling no
sense of connection with the state and questioning the basis of links with Russia and the
feelings of discrimination felt by some Russians.
Despite identifying ethnically with Ukraine, they supported a political rather than ethnic
idea of Ukraine. They did “accept Ukrainian nationalism” and “artificial Ukrainization”
because “it will bring nothing but harm” [C-45]. Rather, the respondent saw Ukrainian
language as “taking root, as the state language” but this has to be a slow “natural” process,
rather than something that is imposed by Kyiv [C-45]. The idea of a “single political
nation . . . was not so far away” and would happen in “10–15 years” because of the
younger post-Soviet generation who experienced only Ukraine’s period of independence.
While this group tried to vilify Russia and undermine the consciousness of ethnic
Russians in Crimea, they were confident in the loyalty of Crimean residents to a politi-
cal Ukrainian idea and agreed that Crimea was changing its orientation toward Ukraine
[C-27]. Although previously Crimean residents had Ukrainian citizenship but did not
affiliate with Ukraine, today the “vast majority of Crimean residents, regardless of ethnicity
consider themselves citizens of Ukraine” [C-26]. This was because of Crimean’s’ “adapt-
ability” and realization that “I live here” and this “means that I need to be a citizen” and
“to participate in the political life of the country in the elections and so on” [C-26]. Hence
Ethnic Ukrainians saw Crimea as anchored to Ukraine because Crimea as “a single whole
with Ukraine is very important to me” [C-49].
This section on Crimea has shown the complexities of being Russian in Crimea. It
has questioned the assumption that Crimea is a region essentially orientated to Russia
and that co-ethnic identification is necessarily analogous to kin-state identification. It
was only Discriminated Russians who indicated a pro-Russia affiliation. Other categories
demonstrated either a willingness to reconcile being Russian with residing in Crimea as a
part of Ukraine, or the dominance of political affiliation with Ukraine over other forms of
identification. The next section will apply the same method to analyze the different ways in
which respondents in the Moldovan case identified as being Romanian and/or Moldovan.
Moldova: The Meaning of Kin Identification
In the second kin majority case, Moldova’s 2004 census indicated a majority iden-
tified ethnically as Moldovan (75.8 percent) while a minority identified as Romanian
(2.2 percent). However, Romania claims that 78 percent are ethnically Romanian in
Moldova bymerging these categories (Department for Romanians Abroad). This is evidence
of a wider ideological rift between pan-Romanianism and Moldovanism.19 Moldovanists
18The respondent gave the commonly cited example of Sergei Tsekov, head of the Russian Community of
Crimea, who is half Bulgarian.
19These divisions exist most starkly in political terms and in terms of interpreting historical events, when
debating between whether the Soviet Union was occupier (pan-Romanians) or liberator (Moldovanists) and
whether the annexation of Bessarabia to interwar Greater Romania was a liberation (pan-Romanians) or an
occupation (Moldovanists).
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see Moldova as a nation in its own right that is separate linguistically and ethnically from
Romania.20 The pan-Romanian approach claims Moldova as an ancient Romanian region
where the Moldovan population forms a constituent part of Romania that was united
politically in Greater Romania (Beks and Graur, 2006; King, 1994; Ihrig, 2008). Eth-
nically and linguistically, pan-Romanians see Moldovan as a synonym of Romanian and
Moldovan as a synonym for “Soviet Romanian” (Deletant, 1978:189). In the Moldovan
case, therefore, the issue is how respondents identified as Romanian and/or Moldovan and
their rationale, with this people-centered bottom-up approach allowing a consideration of
what lies between these two opposed positions.
To delve deeper into this question, four inductively derived identification categories
exemplify the different meanings of being Romanian and identifying with Romania for the
Moldovan case (Table 6):
1. Organic Romanians identified only as Romanian and believed that being Moldovan
was analogous to being Romanian.
2. Cultural Romanians identified as ethnically Romanian but clarified this with stronger,
and more political, links to Moldova.
3. Ambiguous Romanians identified somewhat as Romanian and somewhat asMoldovan,
while defining their language as Romanian.
4. Moldovans identified primarily as Moldovan but explained this in terms of being a
citizen of Moldova.
Again, these categories were derived by a “grounded theory” approach to conceptualize
the areas of agreement (Romanian identification vs. Moldovan identification), and the
dimensions of agreement (linguistic, cultural, political) and the dimensions of disagreement
(organic, contingent) between respondents that led to deriving different inductive categories
to indicate these differences, along political and cultural dimensions (Table 7).
Organic Romanians—“All Moldovans Are Romanians, But Not All Romanians
Are Moldovans”
M-11, M-16, M-2, M-26a, M-8, M-25a, M-25b, M-28, M-1, M-10, M-14, M-18,
M-15,M-49,M-35,M-32,M-42,M-46,M-47,M-53,M-39,M-48. Organic Romanians
collapsed the categories of Romanian andMoldovan to claim the majority of residents were
bothMoldovan and Romanian, contesting the idea there were “visible” differences between
these identifications (cf. Chandra, 2006). They stressed the sameness (ethnic, cultural,
linguistic, and historical) between Romanians and Moldovans [M-2, M-10, M-25a M-28,
M-32, M-35, M-42, M-46, M-39, M-48] to emphasize how they were “Moldovan and
therefore Romanian” [M-16]. They saw Moldova as an artificial and Soviet nation and
instead imagined themselves as part of the Romanian nation.21
Being Moldovan was seen as proof of also being Romanian because “all Moldovans
are Romanians, but not all Romanians are Moldovans” [M-25b, M-16, M-28]. As M-2
explained, he felt that he could be Moldovan, Romanian, and Bessarabian simultaneously
just as he could be a “brother, lover, and son” simultaneously.22 Moreover, Romanians and
20Moldovanism was the official line in the Soviet Union. Today, it is supported by the “neo-Soviet”
Communist Party (March 2007), social movements such as theMoldovan Patriots, and aminority ofMoldovan
academics, such as Vasile Stati, who is famous for the “Moldovan-Romanian dictionary” (see Stati, 2002, 2003).
21Here, Moldova means the territory between the Prut and the Nistru rivers, and thereby excluding
Transnistria.
22Bessarabia (Basarabia) is taken here to be the Romanian way to describe Moldova, differentiating it from
the Moldovan region of Romania.
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Moldovans shared not just the “same language” but, in familial terms, they shared the “same
blood” [M-18] and were “brothers” [M-10,M-14,M-49].Moldovans and Romanians were
therefore imagined to be the same in organic rather that voluntaristic terms (see Zimmer,
2003); as M-11 described, “you don’t have a choice to choose your mother,” emphasizing
that identification as Romanian was not optional but obligatory.
Moldova, as a separate nation fromRomania, was imagined as an “artificial” idea “created”
by Russian and Communist influence, just as Moldovan was also described as not a
“true” language because it is really Romanian [M-1, M-8, M-10, M-14, M-18, M-28,
M-48]. Being ethnically Moldovan was relegated to a false consciousness where those who
identified as just Moldovan did not “understand” that because “they were Moldovan, they
were Romanian” [M-11]. Instead, the idea of being Moldovan was relegated to a regional
concept based on howMoldova was one of the “țari” (administrative territories) that makes
up Romania, along with Wallachia and Transylvania, whereas “identity as a nation, we are
Romanian” [M-8, M-25a, M-25b, M-42].
Moldova’s regionality was embedded in a shared historical narrative with Romania, for
example, Moldova’s unfair annexation from Greater Romania by the Soviet Union [M-2,
M-14]. However it was the longue dure´e perspective that was emphasized, such as their
common Dacian heritage and shared heroes of Decebal, Burebista, and Trajan, who were
the “parents” of the Romanian “brother” and Moldovan “sister” [M-1, M-35].23 This
“Dacomania” is a common device among Romanian nationalists more generally, with the
Dacian period seen to have an “almost messianic ethnic and political role in the creation
of the ideal nation state” (Deletant, 1991:1, 76).24 A further longue dure´e figure was
Ștefan cel Mare, who was “our king” and proof that “we have common history” because he
built fortresses in present day Romania and is also on “our [Moldovan] money” [M-26a,
M-48].25 Therefore, just as it was correct to identify as Romanian, this version of history
was viewed as “right” and “real” in overturning Soviet interpretations of history that had
tried to erase this common history [M-16, M-26a].
This group emphasized the deep historical connection between Romania and Moldova,
which was embedded in the idea that they did not share simply cultural traits such as the
“same language” but were organically intertwined as a region within Romanian because
they had the “same blood” as Romanians [M-18]. The separation from Romania politically
was blamed on the Soviet Union and the Russian “occupation” more generally, which
was blamed also for the artificial cultural separation of Moldova from Romania. This
group strongly identified as a kin majority by indicating a shared sense of ethnicity with
the kin-state and quashing the notion of the home-state being separated by the kin-state
because being Moldovan was seen as a regional identity nested within, and subordinate to,
a Romanian ethnic identity.
Cultural Romanians—“We Are Romanian and Live in Moldova”
M-4, M-5, M-9, M-12, M-19, M-20, M-23, M-24, M-26b, M-33, M-40, M-44,
M-43, M-45, M-51. Cultural Romanians aligned ethnically with Romania, but combined
23Burebista (82–44 B.C.) and Decebal (87–106 A.D.) were leaders of Dacia. Traian (98–117 A.D.) was the
emperor of the Roman Empire during the empire’s conquests of Dacia.
24“Dacomania” was very popular during the Ceausescu era, with Dacia seen as preeminent for the “ethno-
genesis of the Romanians” and the Dacian state, created during the first century B.C., as anticipating the
creation of Greater Romania (Deletant, 1991:1, 76).
25Ștefan cel Mare (Stephen the Great) was a 15th-century king of Moldova and is claimed as a cultural and
historical hero by both Romania and Moldova and by pan-Romanian and Moldovanist approaches.
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this with a political belonging to Moldova. They were more certain about their ethnic
identification than the Ambivalent Romanian category and less vociferously pan-Romanian
than Organic Romanians.
Cultural Romanians agreed that “we are Romanian and live in Moldova.” Hence they
identified as Romanian “from an ethnic point of view” but also as “Moldovan citizens”
[M-19, M-12, M-44, M-20, M-51]. LikeOrganic Romanians, Cultural Romanians believed
also that they “obviously share history, language, culture,” such as traditional clothes and
dances with Romanians [M-33, M-43, M-24, M-12, M-23], and therefore “belong to
Romanian culture” [M-45]. Language, however, was for many respondents the key factor
that made them feel Romanian [M-24, M-40, M-44, M-43].
Alongside identifying ethnically as Romanian, they expressed also political and home
ties to Moldova [M-12, M-19, M-20, M-4, M-33, M-23, M-51, M-40]. Respondents
therefore saw “opportunity” and felt pride in Moldova [M-33, M-24], with one respon-
dent identifying also as a “patriot of Moldova, my country” [M-19]. What is crucial for
these respondents is, like Ethnic Russians in Crimea, that different ethnic and political
identifications were reconcilable and not competing facets of their identity.
Like the Organic Romanians, Cultural Romanians saw Moldova as a Romanian region
[M-9, M-23, M-43] and an “artificial” and “fake” nation and language [M-12, M-20,
M-26b]. It was interesting to observe how these respondents discussed their grandparents
as Romanian because their grandparents were born, or had lived, in Greater Romania,
while they identified their parents as Moldovan because they had lived “most of their lives
under Soviet rule” [M-19, M-33, M-20, M-43, M-51, M-26b, M-40]. As discussed for the
Crimean case, this highlighted the contingency of political experience for affecting how
individuals would identify, demonstrating that descent myths were not “sticky” between
generations (Chandra, 2006).
Cultural Romanians placed a greater emphasis on the artificiality of Moldovan as a
language than of the nation because, as M-20 explained, “if people want to consider
themselves as Moldovan it’s a right, because they are citizens of the Republic of Moldova.”
Unlike the Organic Romanians who saw the Moldovan nation as a false consciousness,
this group was unwilling to claim that people in Moldova should identify as Romanian,
believing that individuals have the right to self-identify. This group was therefore more
voluntaristic and less organic in their self-categorization and categorization of others than
Organic Romanians because “the most important thing for our society is to build a new
citizenship” rather than engage in identity debates [M-20].
While Cultural Romanians ethnically identified as Romanian, they used Moldova’s
regionality to highlight the differences between those residing in Moldova and other
Romanian regions, in contrast to Organic Romanians, who highlighted their inherent
commonalities. Romania was viewed as “more European” while they were “more
Russian,” in terms of mentality, different historical experiences, and contemporary pol-
itics [M-12, M-19, M-5]. Moldova was seen as somewhere that was partly, but not fully,
Romanian, having “always a mix of Romanian legacy but also Soviet legacy,” where this
“mixture of traditions, of habits, of cultural traits” that “makes us different” to Romanians
from Romania [M-40, M-45].
Overall, members of this group did not question their ethnic identification with the
kin-state, but qualified this, unlike Organic Romanians, with their political bond to their
home-state. They qualified their ethnic identification as Romanian also by the feeling that
they were not the same as Romanians, on the basis that Romanians from Moldova had
different political experiences.
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Ambivalent Romanians—“We Entered Modernity Let’s Say, from the Russian
Door” [M-27]
M-3, M-6, M-17, M-27, M-50. Ambivalent Romanians, were both hesitant, and some-
what critical, of identifying as wholly Romanian. This differentiates them from Or-
ganic and Cultural Romanians, who were resolute in their ethnic identification with the
kin-state, but also differentiates them from Moldovans, since they did identify somewhat
with Romania as a kin-state. In general, Ambiguous Romanians were not just ambiguous in
their identification but also were unwilling to talk about their identity because of their lack
of certainty about how they identified [M-3, M-6, M-17, M-27].
Ambivalent Romanians were resolute in describing their language as Romanian [M-3,
M-6, M-17, M-27]. As M-3 explained, you can “call it whatever you like” but it’s the
“same language” even though in terms of everyday vernacular there were “some russisms”
and a “different accent” [M-17, M-27]. However, in terms of ethnic identification, they
were hesitant to discuss the issue of identity [M-3] and did not “really feel Romanian or
Moldovan” but at the “intersection of nationalities” [M-50, M-27].
Like Organic and Cultural Romanians, they described Romania as having the “closest
culture and history” to Moldova because Moldova had been part of Romanian territory
before 1812 and continued to be a Romanian region [M-3, M-17]. However, this historical
connection was mediated by more contemporary political experiences. Romania was now
more “occidental” than Moldova because Moldova was post-Soviet and pro-Russian, while
Romania has an “identity of EU integration” [M-17]. This experience of being different
from Romania was expressed also by M-27 who described how:
we entered modernity from different doors. We are the same ethno-culture, basically, and
language and so on but we are a little bit different. They imitated the French model. We
entered modernity let’s say from the Russian door.
This respondent indicated that he believes those residing inMoldova to be associatedwith
those in Romania, based on common cultural and linguistic characteristics. However, he
refuted theway thatOrganic Romaniansdescribe the populations as identical by highlighting
the modern political experiences, associated with connections to Russia and the Soviet
Union, that are responsible for dividing those in Moldova from those in Romania, like
M-17.
Although they felt somewhat close to Romania, their experience of being in Romania
as students only heightened their sense that were “kind of Bessarabian, kind of Romanian
but not 100 percent Romanian” because “they feel like not being of local origins” [M-27].
Moreover,M-6 described how being Bessarabian hadmeant that he had been stereotyped as
Russian by Romanians while he was a student there in the early 1990s. This was responsible
for this respondent’s ambivalence to identify as Romanian even though he had grown up
in a household with tradition of Romanian culture, and his father had been in involved in
the pan-Romanian Popular Front.26
Ambivalent Romanians agreed in their dislike of ethnic politics and believed instead
that Moldova needs a political “civic identity” [M-6]. Romania was seen as a “friend”
rather than a “brother,” but respondents disliked also how Romania was “too ideological”
in its approach and used a “nationalist ideology” toward Moldova [M-17, M-3, M-6]. In
general, therefore, this group was less involved in primordial reasoning, in terms of defining
26The Popular Front was an organization created in 1989 campaigning for the removal of Russia as the
de facto official language, and recognition of Romanian, and eventually became a movement promoting
unification with Romania (King, 1999).
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themselves in between Romanian and Moldovan, but did stress more recent historical
aspects, in particular the influence of the Soviet Union, which differentiated them from
Romanians. Compared to Organic and Cultural Romanians, they tended to dispute the
subordination of Moldova as a regional identification nested within a Romanian ethnic
identification, since they saw recent political experiences as a crucial factor that separated
them from being fully, and unproblematically, Romanian.
Moldovans—“I Speak Romanian, I Live in the Republic of Moldova and I am
Moldovan” [M-21]
M-7a, M-7b, M-7c, M-21, M-34, M-36, M-37, M-38, M-52, M-56. Moldovans
identified as primarily and “totally” Moldovan [M-7a, M-38] and saw Romanian and
Moldovan as separate but complex categories. These respondents mostly grew up in mul-
tilingual households and had multiethnic families, while those in the other categories grew
up in predominantly Romanian-speaking families.
For many of these respondents, being Moldovan was something obvious to them where
they were “Moldovan of course” because this was the education system they had grown
up in and had Moldovan friends [M-37, M-56]. However, being Moldovan was also seen
as a “messy,” “complicated,” and “convoluted” identity because there was not something
uniquelyMoldovan [M-56,M-34,M-37]. Rather, Moldova was formed from the hybridity
of having been part of both Russia and Romania, and having both Russian and Romanian
culture in Moldova [M-56, M-34, M-37].
In terms of language, the situation was less complicated because all respondents believed
that Romanian and Moldovan were the same language, where Moldovan was just the
“official name” for the language [M-37, M-36]. The comparison between Romania and
Moldova and British and American forms of English was common for these respondents,
who explained that “being American” does not “mean speaking American . . . as they still
speak English” [M-34,M-56]. Thus speakingRomanian did not impede their identification
as Moldovan.
Although they described the language they spoke as Romanian, many Moldovans de-
scribed the multilingual nature of their childhood and home life, although they were
generally educated in Romanian-language schools [M-52, M-34, M-7a, M-56]. As they
explained, this was because they came from multiethnic families, including their parents,
and therefore grew up speaking multiple languages at home, which I witnessed firsthand
when interviewing M-7a and her parents [M-7b, M-7c].
While these respondents had a democratic approach to the ethnic identification of
others, they voiced the need for an independent Moldova and political identity. M-21
discussed how “in Moldova every citizen must understand the civic aspect” because we are
“bound by that ID card of this state” rather than be divided by ethnicity. Several of these
respondents expressed a sense of “love” for Moldova and the “people” because “it is my
country” [M-38]. Hence even if Moldovans were not explicitly anti-Romanian, they were
still explicitly pro-Moldovan, believing that Moldova “deserves” an existence separate from
Romania [M-21].
These respondents explained also the complexities of Romania’s relationship with
Moldova because Romania had to play a “tricky game” regarding Moldova, as the first
state that recognized Moldova’s independence and the first state that “does not recognize it
(Moldova) to the full extent” based on Romania’s (re)unification claims toward Moldova
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[M-21, M-56]. Rather, Moldovans wanted a pragmatic relationship, which recognized that
Romania was an important “friend for Moldova” but, in a complex international situation,
should not be Moldova’s only friend, both within the European Union and post-Soviet
space [M-52, M-21].
Moldovans differed from the other categories in terms of their interpretation of history
and identity, since they indicated no fraternal identification with Romania as a kin-state and
instead wanted a friendly, but not exclusive, relationship with Romania. They described
a sense of shared language with Romania, but no cultural or ethnic identification as
Romanian.
Conclusion
Unlike previous kin-state research, this article has tried to focus on unpacking the
complexities of kin identification in two kin majority cases using the everyday nationalism
approach. In both cases, disaggregating the kin majority showed how respondents rarely
conceived of themselves in singular terms, but in terms of different assemblages (cultural,
ethnic, linguistic, and political) of Russian/Ukrainian or Romanian/Moldovan forms
of identification, demonstrating the elements of contestation over the meaning of kin
identification (see also Abdelal et al., 2006). In Moldova, respondents indicated not just
many ways of being Romanian and Moldovan, but different interpretations about the rela-
tionship between these categories. Moreover, the majority of respondents indicated a move
away from Soviet Moldovanist perspectives toward a perspective that blurs the boundaries,
at least culturally, between being Romanian and Moldovan, and orientates Moldova at an
everyday level increasingly toward Romania, as the kin-state. This is heightened by the
post-Soviet generation who has strengthened its sense of commonalities with Romania in
a way that was not possible for their parents who grew up under the Soviet system. This
emphasizes the contingency of identity, relative to political experiences, rather than the
continuation of identity meanings and experiences between generations, even of the same
family.
In Crimea, at the everyday level, respondents indicated a move away from the kin-state
based on their post-Soviet experience. In the context of contemporary events in Crimea,
this article demonstrates that the nature and strength of Russian identification is often
overplayed and underanalyzed. Many respondents, especially those of the post-Soviet
generation, questioned their Russian identification and/or reconciled it with a political affil-
iation to Ukraine because the majority of their experience had been as a citizen of Ukraine.
This finding is politically relevant for demonstrating that the kin majority did not behave
as a unitary actor, but instead there was a schism between those who problematized being
Russian abroad (Discriminated Russians), those who did not (Ethnic Russians), and those
who refused to identify as ethnically Russian (Political Ukrainians). Rather, what was key
was the sense of discrimination these individuals felt, suggesting that the salience of identity
for ethnic Russian communities elsewhere (e.g., in Latvia and Estonia) may be an impor-
tant future avenue for research, in particular given the geopolitical tensions arising from
the 2014 Ukrainian crisis and the increasing restrictions on ethnic Russians in these states
(citizenship, linguistic rights, language inspectorates), as well as for other kin and diaspora
communities when members of these communities may feel at risk of, or want to politicize,
feelings of home-state discrimination (e.g., relations between the Jewish diaspora and
Israel).
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This bottom-up approach to kin identification in Crimea and Moldova challenges re-
search based on mutually exclusive and deductive census and survey categories by showing
the complexities and contestations surrounding co-ethnic identification. This finding, while
generated from a specific context, has more generalizable relevance by confirming findings
from the literature that explains how it is necessary both to go beyond census categories and
data (Arel, 2002a, 2002b; Dave, 2004; Kertzer and Arel, 2002; Uehling, 2004; Burton,
Nandi, and Platt, 2010) to challenge research that offers an overly thin conceptualization
of ethnicity in favor of thicker meaning-focused accounts, but also to understand, in a
more situated everyday setting, how ethnicity works from the bottom up. This meaning-
focused perspective showed, for example, that individuals (e.g., Political Ukrainians) did
not strategically seek assimilation (cf., Laitin, 1998) but rather offered a normative jus-
tification for wanting to match their belonging to the only state they had experience of
and subvert the ethnic categories imposed on them by the local political and familial
spheres.
This article has shown that it is necessary to work further with these “categories of
practice” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000:4) and experience-near/emic concepts (Geertz,
1975; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012) to question the assumption that ethnicity operates
as a “myth of common descent,” which pervades nationalism studies and political science
(Chandra, 2001, 2006:397; Chandra andWilkinson, 2008;Weber, 1978; Horowitz, 1985;
Smith, 2003). Rather, this article has shown the contingency of ethnicity where this myth
of descent can be disrupted and distorted by political experiences and contexts, such as the
dissolution of a federal state.
Second, when viewed from below, the notion of a kin majority as an ethnically ho-
mogenous majority is much more complex than the “cohesive” communities that political
science had assumed (King and Melvin, 2000:110). As such, it should not be assumed
that kin communities are unitary actors; rather, as this meaning-centered research has
shown, individuals demonstrated different cross-cutting ties, across and between state-level
actors. In the two cases there were key aspects of identification that were associated both
with strong co-ethnic identification (in terms of salience) and identification with the kin-
state, and greater demands for kin-state interaction that had not been teased out by the
confrontational and fuzzy top-down approaches. This demonstrates the need to consider
not only ingroup/outgroup dynamics across minority/majority dyads but also to consider
within-group dynamics, based on the complexities discussed here, both with regards to
kin-state research and identity/ethnic politics research more widely, in particular where
there are contested meanings concerning who these majorities are, and competing kin-
state/home-state claims over these majorities (e.g., Macedonia/Bulgaria, Albania/Kosovo),
where further research could disentangle these dynamics that mean some, but not all,
within the kin majority or kin community consider the kin-state to be their home-
land, and seek interaction with this kin-state. As Hoe (2005) discusses, these dynamics
could hold for unpacking within-group dynamics for diaspora communities, such as the
contested experiences of Chinese identification for (nominally) Chinese communities in
Malaysia and Singapore. Overall, this article demonstrates the need for further agency-
centered engagement with the phenomenon of kin majorities, as well as kin minority
and diaspora communities more generally, to unpack the varying meanings and expe-
riences of identification, and their varying interactions with the kin-state and home-
state, in contributing to further understanding of ethnic politics within these kin-state
nexuses.
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Appendix: Interview Guide
Theme Questions
Basic introduction
questions
What do you do in [fieldwork site]?
What does your organization do?
Where were you born? What about your parents/family?
Culture and politics What do you think about politics in [fieldwork site]?
What do you think about culture in [fieldwork site]?
Self-identification For ethnicity, how do you feel yourself?
What makes you feel [ethnicity]?
What about language? Culture?
Do you think that there are differences between [different
groups] in [case]?
Do you feel near or far to [kin-state]? How do you feel in
[kin-state]?
Kin-state relations What do you think about relations between [kin-state] and
[fieldwork site]?
NOTES: Fieldwork site=Moldova or Crimea; kin-state = Romania (for Moldovan case) or Russia (for Crimean
case).
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